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DTLSV1_LISTEN(3ossl)                OpenSSL               DTLSV1_LISTEN(3ossl)



NAME

       SSL_stateless, DTLSv1_listen - Statelessly listen for incoming
       connections


SYNOPSIS

        #include <openssl/ssl.h>

        int SSL_stateless(SSL *s);
        int DTLSv1_listen(SSL *ssl, BIO_ADDR *peer);


DESCRIPTION

       SSL_stateless() statelessly listens for new incoming TLSv1.3
       connections.  DTLSv1_listen(3) statelessly listens for new incoming DTLS
       connections. If a ClientHello is received that does not contain a
       cookie, then they respond with a request for a new ClientHello that
       does contain a cookie. If a ClientHello is received with a cookie that
       is verified then the function returns in order to enable the handshake
       to be completed (for example by using SSL_accept()).


NOTES

       Some transport protocols (such as UDP) can be susceptible to
       amplification attacks. Unlike TCP there is no initial connection setup
       in UDP that validates that the client can actually receive messages on
       its advertised source address. An attacker could forge its source IP
       address and then send handshake initiation messages to the server. The
       server would then send its response to the forged source IP. If the
       response messages are larger than the original message then the
       amplification attack has succeeded.

       If DTLS is used over UDP (or any datagram based protocol that does not
       validate the source IP) then it is susceptible to this type of attack.
       TLSv1.3 is designed to operate over a stream-based transport protocol
       (such as TCP).  If TCP is being used then there is no need to use
       SSL_stateless(). However, some stream-based transport protocols (e.g.
       QUIC) may not validate the source address. In this case a TLSv1.3
       application would be susceptible to this attack.

       As a countermeasure to this issue TLSv1.3 and DTLS include a stateless
       cookie mechanism. The idea is that when a client attempts to connect to
       a server it sends a ClientHello message. The server responds with a
       HelloRetryRequest (in TLSv1.3) or a HelloVerifyRequest (in DTLS) which
       contains a unique cookie. The client then resends the ClientHello, but
       this time includes the cookie in the message thus proving that the
       client is capable of receiving messages sent to that address. All of
       this can be done by the server without allocating any state, and thus
       without consuming expensive resources.

       OpenSSL implements this capability via the SSL_stateless() and
       DTLSv1_listen(3) functions. The ssl parameter should be a newly
       allocated SSL object with its read and write BIOs set, in the same way
       as might be done for a call to SSL_accept(). Typically, for DTLS, the
       read BIO will be in an "unconnected" state and thus capable of
       receiving messages from any peer.

       When a ClientHello is received that contains a cookie that has been
       verified, then these functions will return with the ssl parameter
       updated into a state where the handshake can be continued by a call to
       (for example) DTLSv1_listen(3), the
       BIO_ADDR pointed to by peer will be filled in with details of the peer
       that sent the ClientHello. If the underlying BIO is unable to obtain
       the BIO_ADDR of the peer (for example because the BIO does not support
       this), then *peer will be cleared and the family set to AF_UNSPEC.
       Typically user code is expected to "connect" the underlying socket to
       the peer and continue the handshake in a connected state.

       Warning: It is essential that the calling code connects the underlying
       socket to the peer after making use of DTLSv1_listen(3). In the typical
       case where BIO_s_datagram(3) is used, the peer address is updated when
       receiving a datagram on an unconnected socket. If the socket is not
       connected, it can receive datagrams from any host on the network, which
       will cause subsequent outgoing datagrams transmitted by DTLS to be
       transmitted to that host. In other words, failing to call BIO_connect()
       or a similar OS-specific function on a socket means that any host on
       the network can cause outgoing DTLS traffic to be redirected to it by
       sending a datagram to the socket in question. This does not break the
       cryptographic protections of DTLS but may facilitate a
       denial-of-service attack or allow unencrypted information in the DTLS
       handshake to be learned by an attacker. This is due to the historical
       design of BIO_s_datagram(3); see BIO_s_datagram(3) for details on this
       issue.

       Once a socket has been connected, BIO_ctrl_set_connected(3) should be
       used to inform the BIO that the socket is to be used in connected mode.

       Prior to calling DTLSv1_listen(3) user code must ensure that cookie
       generation and verification callbacks have been set up using
       SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(3) and SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(3)
       respectively. For SSL_stateless(),
       SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb(3) and
       SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_verify_cb(3) must be used instead.

       Since DTLSv1_listen(3) operates entirely statelessly whilst processing
       incoming ClientHellos it is unable to process fragmented messages
       (since this would require the allocation of state). An implication of
       this is that DTLSv1_listen(3) only supports ClientHellos that fit inside
       a single datagram.

       For SSL_stateless() if an entire ClientHello message cannot be read
       without the "read" BIO becoming empty then the SSL_stateless() call
       will fail. It is the application's responsibility to ensure that data
       read from the "read" BIO during a single SSL_stateless() call is all
       from the same peer.

       SSL_stateless() will fail (with a 0 return value) if some TLS version
       less than TLSv1.3 is used.

       Both DTLSv1_listen(3) will clear the error queue
       when they start.

       SSL_stateless() cannot be used with QUIC SSL objects and returns an
       error if called on such an object.


RETURN VALUES

       For SSL_stateless() a return value of 1 indicates success and the ssl
       object will be set up ready to continue the handshake. A return value
       of 0 or -1 indicates failure. If the value is 0 then a
       HelloRetryRequest was sent. A value of -1 indicates any other error.
       User code may retry the SSL_stateless() call.

       For DTLSv1_listen(3) a return value of >= 1 indicates success. The ssl
       object will be set up ready to continue the handshake.  the peer value
       will also be filled in.

       A return value of 0 indicates a non-fatal error. This could (for
       example) be because of nonblocking IO, or some invalid message having
       been received from a peer. Errors may be placed on the OpenSSL error
       queue with further information if appropriate. Typically user code is
       expected to retry the call to DTLSv1_listen(3) in the event of a
       non-fatal error.

       A return value of <0 indicates a fatal error. This could (for example)
       be because of a failure to allocate sufficient memory for the
       operation.

       For DTLSv1_listen(3), prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0, fatal and non-fatal errors
       both produce return codes <= 0 (in typical implementations user code
       treats all errors as non-fatal), whilst return codes >0 indicate
       success.


SEE ALSO

       SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(3), SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(3),
       SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb(3),
       SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_verify_cb(3), SSL_get_error(3),
       SSL_accept(3), ssl(7), bio(7)


HISTORY

       The SSL_stateless() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.

       The DTLSv1_listen(3) return codes were clarified in OpenSSL 1.1.0.  The
       type of "peer" also changed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.


COPYRIGHT

       Copyright 2015-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
       this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
       in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
       <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.

3.3.2                             2024-09-04              DTLSV1_LISTEN(3ossl)

openssl 3.3.2 - Generated Tue Sep 10 11:12:07 CDT 2024
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